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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/07/2011

Accident number: 757

Accident time: 10:35

Accident Date: 07/06/2009

Where it occurred: AF/0308/01635,
MF1847, Qala-eAhmad Khan Village,
Bagram District,
Parwan Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: None

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: hard
Date last modified: 15/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
use of shovel (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-02 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Central to investigate the de-mining accident
involving [the Victim] the Section Leader of [Demining group] DT-02. The accident occurred at
1035 hours on 07 June 2009 at minefield number AF/0308/01635/MF1847, located in Qala-eAhmad Khan village, Bagram district of Parwan province.
SUMMARY:
MF # AF/0308/01635/MF1847 is an anti-personnel mine contaminated task around Bagram
Airbase. During Russian invasion on Afghanistan a security belt of landmine was established
by the government forces to secure the airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. MF 1847 is
heavily contaminated minefield covered 57,335 sqm area, [Demining group] DT-02 cleared
12,986 sqm area and found/destroyed 370 AP mines till the accident date.
On 07 June 1035 hours [the Victim] the section leader of mentioned team stopped his
deminer [Name removed] and started to work instead of him as the deminer was getting tired.
He hit the top of a mine with his prodding tool so the accident occurred. There is a wound with
regular edges on the forehead of section leader and some abrasions on his face and left eye.
The PPE was used during the operation, but the visor was broken down by a forceful back out
of excavation tool possibly the shovel and caused the injury to him. According to the
investigation report, the pictures of wound, the view of scene and the picture of broken visor,
it seems that the shovel was used during operation. As the ground was hard and required to
be prepared by MDU first, but it was not planned and ignored by team command group.
CONCLUSIONS:
It was the fault of team leader for giving permission to section leader to work instead of a
deminer. The section leader himself made a big mistake in terms of giving up his own job as a
controller and getting involved in detection and investigation of signals. The poor
management of the operations in the task was another factor contributed to the accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[Demining group] management is recommended to strengthen the internal QA and strictly
control the teams in terms of team/operations management and site operations planning.
[Demining group] is also recommended to make sure that the job description is will
understood by command group. And to ensure that the safest way of conducting demining
operations is being practiced. In order to prevent such cases in future, the [Demining group]
Operations department is requested to come up with a management solution to such cases
and present it to MACCA OPS department by no later than 2nd July 2009.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 946

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Eye; minor Face
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . wound with regular edges on the
forehead. . and some abrasions on his face and left eye "

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the Victim and his Team Leader had made a “mistake” when the
Victim took over excavation from a tired deminer. The secondary cause is listed as
Inadequate equipment because excavation in hard ground with a shovel is patently
dangerous. The fact that the ground should have been mechanically prepared was noted by
the investigators, and the fact that it was not was a Management Control Inadequacy which
they noted as a cause.
In the absence of photographs, it is uncertain whether the Victim was wearing his visor. It
seems that the blade of the shovel was thrown back at the Victim and it may have hit the
Visor, breaking it’s face, or hit his face causing a “wound with regular edges” (which a broken
visor is unlikely to do).
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.
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